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ONETARISM has come under increasingly
sharp attack over the past few years. Recent critics
have detailed “The Trouble With Monetarisni,”
argued that the choice is between Monetarismn or
Prosperity and even recoiled in horror from The
ScourgeofMonetarism.1 Various accounts ofthe fail-
ure of monetarism in Argentina, Canada, Chile and
Great Britain have received widespread attention.2
Moreover, monetarism in the United States has been
described as a “Cod that failed,” and there have been
numerous reports that mnonetarism is now virtually
dead.~
‘Alan Reynolds, “i’he Trouble with Monetarism,” Policy Review
(Summer 1982), pp. 19—42; Iryan Could, John Mills and Shaun
Stewart, Monetarism OrProsperity (Macmillan Press Ltd., 1981):
and Nicholaus Kaldor. ‘lie Scourge of Monetaris,n (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1982).
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See. for example, “Monetarism loses face north of the border,’
Economic Diary, Business Week(December 20, 1982), p. 12; john
Kirhyshire, “Monetaris,n Remains Economic Scapegoat,’ New
YorkJournalofcosnsnerce, Nove,nher4, 1982; “In Britain, mone-
tarism took a heavier toll,” Business Week (April 4, 1983), pp.
66—67; Jeremy Morgan, “Argentina Abandons Monetaris,n.” New
YorkJournal ofCommerce, June 19, 1982; and Everett C. Martin,
“Milton Friedman’s Proteges in Chile See Influence Declining
Because of Recession,” The Wall Street Journal, July 27, 1982.
Even discussions ofmonetarism can produce conflicts; see ‘‘Fried-
man’s Views Ignite Political Debate in Peru,” Washington Post,
November 22, 1981.
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For the most recent citation that monetarism has failed in the
United States, see “The Failure of Monetarism,” Business Week
(April 4, 1983), pp. 64—67, For earlier criticisms, see Andrew F.
Brimmer, “A Return to Monetarism: the Dangers,’ American
Banker, February 3, 1983; Stuart E. Eizenstat, “Volcker’s Monc-
tarist Policy: Painful, Costly,” The PJew York Times. October 18,
1982: William D. Nordhaus, ‘‘Destroyingthe Economy to Save It,”
The New York Times, December 26. 1982; Peter Field, “The
Death ofReagaisoinies, ‘‘ Euroinoney (September 1982), PP. 95—
107; and Irving Kristnl, ‘‘The Big Questiomi: Is ‘Reaganomics’
Working?” The Wall StreetJournal, October 14, 1982, Apparently
the only nations where mnnctari.sm currently is practiced unchal-
lenged are the People’s Republic ofChina and the Soviet Union:
see Leo Coodstadt, “The GreatChinese Economic Retreat,”Enro-
money (April 1981), PP 73-77; Milton Friedman, “Marx and
Mioney,” Newsweek (October 27, 1980), P. 95; and Milton Fried-
man, “Defining Monetarism,” Newsweek (July 12, 1982), P. 64.
The alleged death of monetarism could not have
come at a more inappropriate time. Milton Friedman
and Anna Schwartz Imave just published a massive
volume entitled Monetary Trends in the United States
and the United Kingdom: Their Relation to Income,
Pricesand InterestRates 1867—197.5.~ In that text, they
present extensive amid detailed evidence that supports
the basic rnonetarist propositions regardimig theimpact
ofmoney on the economny.” It would he both ironic amid
puzzling if, at the very time that their findings are
published, we were todiscover that thesefundamental
relationships suddenly have broken down.
Yet, this claim is precisely the one that critics of
rnonetarism have made. They charge thatrecent finan-
cial innovations and the expanding use of previous
financial innovations have so distorted the measure
and meaning of money that monetarism, no matter
how well supported by historical studies, is no longer
valid.6 Since this claim has been mnade before and
found, in each instance, to be groundless, it should he
niet with considerable skepticism.’
‘Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz Monetary Trends in the
United States and the UnitedKingdom: Their Relation to income,
Prices and Interest Rates, 1867—1975 (University of ChicagoPress,
for the National Bureau ofEconomic Research, 1982).
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For detailed reviewsofthejustpublished Friedman andSchwartz
volume, see David Laidler, ‘‘Friedman and Schwartz on Monetary
irends: A Review ,krtiele,” Journal of international Money and
Finance (December 1982), PP. 293—305; Thomas Mayer, “Mone-
tan’ Trends in the United States and the United Kingdom: .5
Review Article~,’’Journal of Economic Literature (December
1982), pp. 1528—39; Chades A, E. Coodhart, “Monetary Trends in
the United States and the Uniter1 Kingdom: A British Review,”
Journal of Economic Literature (Decensher 1982), PP. 1540—51;
and Robert E. I JaIl, ‘‘MonetaryTrends in the United Statt’sand the
United Kingdom: A Review from the Perspective ofNew Develop-
ments in Monetary Economics,” Journal of Economic Literatnre
(December 1982), pp. 1552—56.
‘For arecent version ofthis claim, see Edward P. loldessey, “New
Barmk Accounts May Force Fed to End Experiment in Monetar’
ism.” The Wall StreetJournal, December 28, 1982.
7
F’nr an assessment ofthe‘‘snonetarissn has failed”claimn circa 1972,
see Darryl R. Francis, “has Monetarism Failed? — The Record
Examined,” this Review (March 1972), PP. 32—38.
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This article attempts to assess whether current
rumors of the demise of monetarism are greatly ex-
aggerated.
A TAlE OF TWO MONETARISMS:
‘A Ii NIEI}l~PROPO’II EONS “5
5O.RMATIVE PRESCRIPTION
Perhaps the most significant obstacle to urmderstand-
ing many of the current arguments, hoth for and
against monetarism, is that the term typically is ban-
died ahout with little or no specific referemice to its
intended meaning. This isa problem because monetar-
ismn can refer to two very differentkinds ofstatemnents.
Monetarism can refer to specific, testahle, scientific
propositions; it also can be used to indicate a set of
policy suggestions or alternatives to achieve desired
economic goals.8 In the scientific sense, we can assess
easily whether mnonetarism has failed. In the norma-
tive or policy sense, however, it may he impossible to
agree whether monetarist policies have even been
attempted, let alone have failed.
illonetariem as a Science
Looked at in a scientific sense, monetarismn is the
label attached to a common set of theoretical and
empim’ical propositions regarding the significant and
stable relationshipbetween the momiey stockand other
important economic variables. There is a mnethodolo—
gy, common to all sciences, that is used to assess the
logical validity and empirical stmpport for competing
theories. Scientific theories never die by themselves;
thes’ are ahamidoned omilv when a better theory comes
along. If monetarismn, in the scientific sense of the
word, has failed, it musthave succumbed toan alterna-
tive non-monetarist explanation.
It is clear that, within the scientificframework ofthe
rise and demise oftheories, mnonetarism has not heen
superseded by newer or superior theories of inflation
or real output or spemmding growth.9 Instead, critics
charge that the behavioral relationships that worked
well in the past have shifted and that the previously
stahle relationships underlying the mnonetarist view
have now become unstable. Ifthis has occurred, then
the propositions labeled monetarism would become
less useful. In the extremne, they would even be re-
l’his distinction is discussed briefly in Milton Friedman’s ‘‘De-
fining Monetarism,”
°Thepresumed failure ofall economic theories has been noted
recesmtly by John Gm’eenwald, “~VhereRave All the Answers
Cone?” Time (January 17, 1983), pp. 36—37.
placed by somne previously less useful, non—monetarist
theory. This issue is analyzed in the latter part of this
article.
Monetansm as an Economic Policy
In addition to its scientific meaning, however,
monetarismn also can be used in a normative or policy
sense. As such, it serves as a label fora set ofeconomic
policy prescriptions intemided to achieve certain ceo—
nomnic goals, Ofcotmrse, such policy prescriptions pre-
suppose that mnonetarism, in the scientific sense, is
valid and that policvmnakers cami exert some control
over money growth.
There are several fundamnental problems with
attempting toassess the success or failure ofnormative
monetarismn. First, there may he no common agree-
ment on whether a mnonetarist policy has heen fol-
lowed; consequently, it will he virtuall impossible to
demonstrate that it has failed. To illustrate this prob-
1cm, consider the data shown in table 1. A number of
countries have announced a variety ofmonetan’ aggre-
gate targets over the past three years; six of these are
represented in the table. Because these countries have
adopted and publicly announced such targets,
ouscommentators have labeled their policies as mono—
tarist. Becatise these targets generally were not
achieved and because economic conditions in these
countries over the past three years were generally
poor, it has been charged that monetarism has finled.
At the samne time, otheranalysts have used the samne
data to support the opposite conclusion. Because the
announced targets were not achieved, they argue, the
actualbehaviorofthe monetary authorities wasclearly
non-monetarist. Further, the resultant adverse ceo-
nomie conditions are used to demonstrate why mono-
tarist policies should have heen fbllowed.
A prime examnple of the problem associated with
determnining whether a specific policy is monetarist is
the widespreaddisagreement overwhether the Feder-
al Reserve has been following a “monetarist” policy
since October 1979. mo When a group ofpolic~nnakers,
economists and financialanalysts were asked this ques-
tion recently by the Joint Economic Committee ofthe
U.S. Congress, their answers ranged fromthe strongly
affirmative to the strongly negative to the inscrutably
‘°OnOctober 6, 1979, the Federal Resen’e announced that it had
changed its operating procedures to achieve enhanced control
over money. Thischange in policy implementation was relaxed in
October 1982,
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Table I




Country aggregate Permod 7 rgeted Actual
Canada Ml II 1979 to quarter Sto9°. 82%
centered on 9 1980
quarter centeredon
sl9Batupresent 4toB 4.6
Japan M plus Cbs Ill1979-4111980 64
IV 1980—IV 1981 10 106
IVlg81—1V1982 8 80
Switzerland Monetary 1 1979-4211980 4 23
base 1 1980- 2(1981 4 8
12il981 1 982 82
Undndttmgdctn MS 1980—41981 Ttol 9
2/98 41 6tqlO S
2/982—41985 StoI2 9
UtntedStates Ml tVl$ IV 980 4to& 3
1V1980—IV 9th 6to8 0
V198—IVIS$2 5to55 85
Westeerineny Cantr IV 979.-tv 980 SloB 48
Sank Money IV/ 980-tV 198 41*7 35




4ComparableloS 5—6 0 percent range forshift adjusted M B
that arc unlikely to fit neatly into any eat gom —
mon tarist or non mnonetarist. Disagreement over the
likely outcomes of policy action ~ ill load tv picallx to
cliff~rcnt asses ments by polie\makers and othcrs
about the ‘ success ‘ of’policv actions To some policy
vvill have succc ‘dod to others mt will have failed.
Debates ox er whether monetam ist monetary pohcmes
have been tried or whether they have failed or even
whether they were the appropriate tnonetarist polkies
arc unlikely to be resolx ed. In the normatmve sense a
discussion of whether mnonetarism has failed ms both
inconclusive and probably nonsensical as long as tm
%ion tarisin and tin. Fe~iral Rest rm. s Conduct of lion tarti there is such xx mdcsprcad disaurcement. These discus-
Polmemj Comp ndmum ol Isew-, Prcpam’ed for the Use ol thc
Suhcommmttee on Monetan and hi cal Policy of th ‘ Joint Eeo sions only servetodrawattention from the crucial issue
nomm ‘ Comnmnittee. Congress of the Unmted State 97 Cong, 2 that can be resolved — whether monetarism in the
ss. (U 5’ Co’ensmemst Printing Office Dcc -mb‘r 30, 198~l
cryptic.” The basic problem is simnpl~that reasonable
people can differ both on their interpretation of
whether a specificpolicy is monetarist and whether it is
being carried otmt in a monetarist fashion.
A different problem with assessments of policy fail-
ures is that policymnakers and the general public
appear to shiftback and forth annong a variety ofgoals;
further, they often fail to agree among themselves on
the likely outcome of policy actions. tQ Flip-flopping
between policy goals can lead to erratic policy actions
52
For the appam’ent “shiftiness’’ of muonetary policy goals, see
Richard Froyen, “A Testofthe Endogeneitvof Monetary Policy,”
Journal of Econometrics (July 1974), pp. 175—88; Rieham’d K.
Abramns, Richard Froyen amid Roger N, IVand, “Monetary Policy
Reaction Functions, Consistent Expectations, and the Burmss
Era,”Journal of Money, Credit and Banking(Februarv 1980), pp.
30—42; John H. Wood, “A ModelofFederal Resem’veBehavior,”in
Ceorge Horwich, ed., Monetary Process and Policy: A Sympo-
5mm (Richard D. Irwin, 1967) pp. 135—66; and Thomas NI. Hay-
rilesky, Robert H, Snapp amid Robert L, Schwertzer, “Test ofthe
Federal Reserve’s Reaction to the State ofthe Economy,” Social
Science Quarterly (March 1975), pp. 743—52, For a statement of
the failure ofmonetary polie~makersto agm’ee on what the actual
outeomneofpolicy is likely to be, see John M. Berry, “Fed to Resist
Call on Hill for Its Economic Coals,” Washington Post, ~Apnil5,
1983.
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scientific sense, has failed. Ifscientific monctarism has
failed, then discussions over normative monctarist
issues arc mncaninglcss; there can be no useful nione-
tarist policies if the relationships between mnoncy
growth and other imnportant economic variables are
unstable or nonexistent. On the other hand, if scien-
tific mnonctarism’n has not failed, discussions over
whether some policy can be labeled as monetarist arc
mere bagatelles; what mnatters is not the label attached
to the policy, bmit the actual pattern of money growth
that the policy produces. The crucial issue that must
be addressed is the success or failure of scientific
momictarismn.
FOURS •WF.LL-KNOWN SCIENTIFIC
\IO’\ 11 ;RIS 1 PROPOSI I IONS H W F.
TH.EY FAILED?
There are a large number of economic propositions
that havecome to be associated with monetarism, or at
least with individuals who have been labeled
mnonetarists. 13 We do not intend to investigate all such
propositions. Instead, wefoemis on wimat we consider to
be four key monetarist propositions. The first three
53
F’or statements, suggestions and, in souseeases, extensive listsof
what monetarism means, sec Karl Brunner, “The Role of Money
and Monctan’ Policy,” this Review (Jmsly 1968), pp. 9—24; Darryl
R. Fm’aneis, “AnApproach to Monetary and Fiscal Mammagemnent,”
thisReview (November 1968), pp. 6-10; Allan Mcltzcr, “Control-
ling Money,” this Review (May 1969). pp. 16—24; Karl Brmmnner,
“The MonetaristView of Keynesian Ideas,” Lloyds Bank Review
(October 1971), pp. 3.5—19; A, Robert Nobay and Harry C. John-
son, “Monetarism: A Historic-Theoretic Pem’speetiv’e,“Journal of
Economic Literature (June 1977), pp. 470—85; Jeromne L. Stein,
ed,, Monetarisnm (North-Holland Publishing Co, 1976); Thomas
Mayer, The StrmietnreofMonetarism,m (IV, IV. Norton & Company,
use., 1978), especially p. 2; Brian Morgan, Monetarists and
Keynesians: Their Contribution to Monetary Theory (Halsted
Press, 1978), especially pp. 89—91; Howard R. Vane and John L,
Thompson, Monetarisnm: Theory, Evidence and Policy (Halsted
Press, 1979), especially pp. 3—16; Douglas h). Purvis, “Monctnr-
ism: AReview,” CanadianJournalof Economics (Februarv 1980),
pp. 96—121; David Laidler, “Monetarism: An Interpretation and
an Assessment,” The Economic Journal (March 1981), pp. 1—28;
and John Burton, “TheVarieties ofMonetarism and Their Policy
Implications,” The Three Banks Review (June 1982), pp. 14—31.
Needlessto say, these areonly afewofthe hugenumber ofarticles
and hooks on this issue, Moreover, there are a host ofalleged
kinds ofmonetarists and monetarism, John Burton provides the
followimig listing in ‘‘The Varieties of Monctarism’’: Marxist,
F’riedmnanite, rational expectations, global, fiscal, Austrian and
Thateherite. Herbert Stein, in “Monetarism Under Fire,” AEI
Economist (September 1981), pp. 1—8, distinguishes three cate-
gories of monetarists: half—way, true—blue and gold—standard,
Rohem’t I) . Auerbaeh in ,lionetorism and time Federal Reserve’s
Conduct of,\ionetanj Policy, pp. 39—’45. lists the following kinds
ofmnonetarists: exaggerated or msaive, cassico. asvmnmetric, creep’
ing asymmetric, commodity target, distant target, ehamsgimsg target,
mrnmltiple target, conventional, cemstral banks, one—issue—at—a—time
and interest rate. Finally, there are numerous different kinds of
pejorative monetanism that arc memitioned frequently; amnosig our
Growth in the Money Supply and GNP




propositions concern ‘what money does”; they repre-
sent the relationship between money growth and time
growth of aggregate spending, prices and real output.
The fourth propositionfocuses on the controllability of
money growth. The first three propositions demon-
strate why money matters; the fourth proposition in-
vestigates whether monetary policy matters.
Proposition 1: There is a close and stable rela-
tionship between the growth ofmoney and the growth
oftotal spending. This relationship can he investigated
in a variety ofways. One simple way is to compare the
growth ofMl, the narrow monetary aggregate consist-
ingofcurrency and checkable deposits, to the growth
of aggregate spending, measured by Gross National
Product (GNP) or Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
This is done in chart 1 for a large number of countries
for the 1969 to 1980 period. It is clear from the chart
that, in general, there is a very close relationship be-
tween growth in money and growth in total spending;
the vast majority ofthe countriesarc clustered close to
the 45-degree line that denotes equal growth rates for
both mnoncy and spending over the period.
fhvorites arc’. miscreant, flinty-everl, macho, knee-jerk, simple,
simplistic and mnechanieal. Civen the ahuve varieties of both
muonctarism amid monetarists, it is crucial, in any’ evaluation of
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A more analytical method of assessing the rela-
tionship between growth in NIl and CNP forthe Unit-
ed States involves the use of the St. Louis equation,
which was developed specifically to investigate the
imnpact of monetary and fiscal actions on CNP.
The St. Louis equation typically is written as:
44




wheret, M and E arc the annualized quarterly growth
rates of GNP, Ml and high-employment govcrnmnenst
expenditures, respectively, m~and e~represent the
impact of current and lagged values of M and E, m’e-
spectively, the constant term represents the impact of
other influensees on CNP growth, ansd i = 0 4
shows that the equation investigates the extent to
which GNP growth in quarter t is affected by the
current and past four quarters’ growth in NI and E.
Table 2 shows the results of estimating this equation
over the period from 11/1960 to IV/1982. There are
three key aspects to these results. First, as the R2
shows, the estimated equation accounts for a sizable
proportion ofthe actual fluctuations in GNPgrowth; in
this instance, about 30 perecnst of the variation in Y is
explained by the variables on the right-hansd side ofthe
equation. Second, the explanatory power of the equa-
tion isderived solely from themonetary variables; only
the estimated coefficients ons M are statistically differ-
ent from zero. Third, the sum of the coefficients on M
is not significantly different from one; this indicates
that, other things unchanged, any given change in the
growth of Ml will produce the same change in the
growth of GNP within five quarters.
Another way of looking at this relationship can be
seen inchart 2, which contains the year-to-year growth
rates of nominal GNP and Ml for the United States.
Clearly, changes in the growth of GNP from one year
to the next arepositively associated with changes in the
growth of Ml.
If monetarism has fhilcd due to recent financial in-
novations, then the relationships estimated in table 2
and shown in chart 2 should have eroded substantially
since late 1979.14 This purported erosion is not appar-
ent in chart 2~the link between money growth and
ecomsomnie activity since 111/1979 seems no different
mmsimscc it is msever possible to identifya single begimimsimig poimit for a
commtiouousprocess like flssamscial imsoovatiomi, the date ofthe Fed’s
ehuusge in operating procedures (Oetohcr 1879) is mmsed as the
hs’cak poisst ims tlsis. and all subsequemst, analysis.
Table 2
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‘~bsoh4e statuesoft atulteain parentheses
Stafisimoalty signmfieant atthe5 percent tevet
from that which existed during the previous two de-
cades.
Of course visual evidence is nc er conelu ‘iv c-
appearances always can be deceiving. What is signifi-
cant is that there is nso statistical support that the
relationship between money and spending in the St.
Louis cqmmation has broken down in reeemst v cams
When the parameters of the St. Lommis equation vs crc
tested for their structural stability the hypothesis that
tlsc structure had slipped’ in the later period was
rejected. 1 Thus there does not ippcar to has c been a
I Tb tahilmty of th cm their mit mis qmiatmors I m c‘annie d h~
e tsmssatirsg
1
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where D, arlummuvvariable, equals 1 fromu 11/ t960 to 111/1979 amid
0 othcnvisc. The stability test forthe coefficients on Ml growth is
eomsducted by testing the joimit hypothesis that all of the estimates
of m
2~
are simultamieouslv equal to zero. The calculated F—statistic
for this test is 2.01: the critical F-valise is 2.72 for the 5 pereemst
signifmeamice level, Cousequemitlv, the hypothesis that the coef—
ficiemits sumi Ml growthlsaye chassged since 111/1979 cars herejected
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Charm 3
M~ Growth and Inflation U
over the period from 1973 to 1980, With fess’ excep-
tions, those countries with the greater Ml growth also
had the higher rates of inflation.
Another way to assess the relationship between
price changes amid money growth is to separate the
monetary and non—mnonctarv influences oil prices to
determninc their relative importance at various poimits
in time. Since it is the trend growth in money that
influences prices, the momietarv infimmemice on therate of
inflation iii any’ period is the growth imi momiev
some ftuirlv long past period. - Chart 3 reports the
long—term rate of Nil growth (mncasured In- its 12—
quarter movimig average) and the quarter—to—quarter
17Thcre is exhaustive literature attestimigto the existence of a lorsg
lag between miiomiey growth and inflation rates, For reecest cvi-
demice, see Keith NI. Carlson, “The Lag Frossi Momicy to Prices.”
this Recieu’ (October 1980), pp. :3—10; John A. Tatumn, “Emiergy
Pricesand Short—Rumi EcoisomicPerlbrmiiance,” this Reviemt’ (Jamirs—
ary 1981). pp. 3—17: and Dallas S. Batten, “Money Growth Stabil-
ity’ amid Inflation: An intermiational Comparison,’’ this Review
(October 1981), pu. 7—12.
rate of growth ofthe implicit pm-icedleflator for CNP for
the United States. In gemieral. the path of inflation
lollovs’s that of long—run money growth. In fact, after
accounting for oil—price slsoeks, long—mu Nil growth
explains over 80 percent ofthe variation in thequarter—
to—quarter rate of inflation, 18
35ee Carlson, “The Lag From Money to Prices,” The ressmlts of





= ~0.866 ± 1.091 ~ Mm ,L736 1)1 ±0.61±5D2
(2.19) (13.30) i = 0 (3.43) (1.42)
-- 0.001 1~m + 0.065 ji~_., —1±15)5
(0.11) (3.96) — (0.29)
+ 0.041 ~..
(2.93)
= .83 SE = 1.19 DiV = 1.86
where P3
is the rate of inflatiomi (miieasured by the CNP price
deflator) in quarter t, 1)1 amid D2 are dmioimy variables for the
control amid decomitrol phases of the Nixon wage—price control
period, fr isthe growth rateoftherelative price ofenergy’ andthe
absolute “attics oft-statistics arc in parentheses.
1960 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 1982
im rhe Mm grmwth line represents a mwelve-quarmer moving average al Mi growth. The quarter.ta-quavter rote of change
0
m the GNP deflator is
displayed 1±the inflation lime. The vertical lime betweem 111/79 and tV/79 nd rates the chonge in Federal Reserve operamimg procedures and the
beg immimg of f’mmonc iai imnova tic ms.
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Chart 4
Deviations of Short-Run Money Growth from Trend U
Once again, there appears tobe no significant break-
down in this relationship after late 1979: the long-run
rate of money growth has declined during the past 3½
years as has the rate of inflation. Moreover, an econ-
ometric investigation indicates that there has been no
breakdown in the Mi-inflation relatiomiship over the
past three years’9
Proposition 3: Short-run changes in money growth,
i,fs’uffieiently sharp, produce real output movements.
Conceptually, a change in money growth creates a
monetary disequilibrium: the quamitity of money that
individuals desire to holddifl~rs from the quantitythat
they actually are holding. By altering their rate of
spending, they attempt either to increase or to de-
crease their money holdings to a desired level. Even-
tually, as discussed previously, this change in the rate
more rigorous investigation of a breakdown in the money
growtls—inflatiomm retatiomishsip entails cundmmetimig a test simihan to
that imi footmiote 15 for the imiflatiomi equation cited in footmiote 18.
The c~slcuhatedF—statistic for this test is 1,53, well below the
critical value of 2,72 at the 5 percemit significance level. l’he
hypothesis tisat the coeffsciesets omi NIl growth in the infiatioms
equatiomi have ehamigecl simice 111/1979 cams he rejected.
of aggregate spending will cause a change in the rate
of inflation.
In the short run, however, producers cannot tell
immediately whether this change in the rate of aggre-
gate demand (spending) is permanent or merely tem-
porary; thus, they respond initially by changing their
rate of production. That is, the change in money
growth results in a deviation of real economic activity
from its “normal” rate. Only when the change in
spending (motivated by the monetary disequilibrium)
has been identified as permanent will producers
change their prices and return production back to its
normal rate. Thus, the impact ofa change in the rate of
nsoney growth shows up initially and temporarily on
output and employment. 20
This proposition is demonstrated in chart 4, vvhich
reports the deviation of short-run Nil growth (inca-
2t
For adiscussion ofthe niicroeconomie ratiomiahe behind thetiming
ofthe effect ofchiasiges in mnuuev growth on real output (istitiahly)
amid prices (ultimately), sec Carlsors, ‘“[lie I
5
ag From Momiey to
Prices,,’’ pp. 6—8.
1960 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 1982
Li The plotted line representm a te,a.q—crter moving everage ml moey m rmwth mi——s m merelve- qearter maving average at money greeth, The
ice between 111179 and Iv/79 indicates thechange ‘n Federal Reserve operating pracedtnes and the beg inning at tironciot innom aliens.
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suredby its two-quartermoving average)from its long-
run trend (measured by its 12-quarter moving aver-
age)- The shaded areas represent periods defined as
recessions by tbse National Bureatt of Economic Re-
search. Every downturn in economic activity in the
last two decades has been associatedwith a substantial
slowing in money growth relative to its trend;
every substantive slowdown in short-run Mi growth
has been associated with ami economic downturn.2t
Although the 1966 episode was nottechnically labeled
a recession, the United States experienced a “growth
recession”; realGNP growth fell from about 10percent
tozero followingthe draniaticdecline in money growth
in 1966,
There appears to he no breakdown in this rela-
tionship since late 1979- In fact, this proposition is
supported quite strongly by recent events. For exam-
plc, money growth declined substantially in early 1980
(almost 5 percentage points below its treisd); accom-
panying this decline in Ml growth, real economic
activity declined rapidlyand dramatically. By the third
quarter of1980, money growth had rebounded and the
economy began pulling omit of a short-lived recession.
When short-rtsn money growth declined from5½ per-
centage points above its trend in IV/1980 to about 4
percentage points below its trend by IV/1981 (an un-
precedented drop), however, the economy headed
into its second recession in as many years, a recessiors
from which we have only reeemitly begun to recover.
Proposition 4: Monetary authorities can control the
rate ofmoneygrowth. Within the context ofmonetary
policy, the first three monetarist propositions are rel-
atively unimportant unless the growths of money is
controllable. The money definition that we have used
in this stttdy, Ml, consists of currency and checkable
deposits, the two things generally offeredand accepted
in exchange for goods and semvices. The monetary
authority cannot control Mi directly because the
cbseckahledeposits that make up a large part ofMl are
created by depository imsstitutions. The monetary au-
thority, however, tbsrough its open market operations
amAgaim, this propositiomihas beemidocumemitedextensively’, See, for
example, Milton Friedman amid! Asisia J, Schwartz, “Momsey amid
Business Cycles,” Review of Economnic.s and Stattstics (Supple—
meist: Fehnuan’ 1963), pp. 32—78; William Poole, ‘The Reha-
tiosiship of Monetary Dccclerations to Busimiess Cycle Peaks:
Another Look at the Evidence,“Journal ofFinance (June 1975),
pp. 697—712: Dallas S. Battemi and R. W. Hafer, “Shom’t-Run
Momie,y Crowth Ehuctuatiomis amid Real Ecomiomnic Activity: Some
lmphicaticsns for Momictary Targeting,’ this Recieec (May 1982),
pp. 15—20; and Dallas S. Batten amsd F. W. Hafer, “isThere a Role
for Nlonetam-y Targeting?” Reeiew of Busimses.s and Economic Re-
search (fisrthcomising, 19831. The last twcs articles cited above die—
momistrate that siniih~sr results arc mmmdacross ctiumitnies as well,
Chn,t S
Growth in Reserves and Demand Deposits






and lending to depository institutiorss, cancontrol the
stock of reserves held by depository institutions upon
which these checkable deposits are based. As a result,
the monetary authority can control the growth of
money supply indirectly by controllimsg the rate of
growth of these reserves.22
In the very short run, changing asset preferences of
individuals may cause discrepamicies between the rate
of growth of reserves and that of checkable deposits.
Yet, over longer periods of time, these growth rates
eonformn closely across a wide variety of monetary imi-
stitutions, as exhibited in chart 5 for a large number of
countries. This chart illustrates that, over time, re-
serve growth and demand deposit growth are asso-
ciated closely. Moreover, because checkable deposits
are a large portion of the Ml definition of money,
reserve growth is, then, a pmerequisite for money
growth-
rchis analysis neglects the role that currency plays iii
the money supplyprocess. Since currency in the hands
of the nonbank public is another potential source of
bank reserves, changes in the public’s demand for
currencyalso maybe the source ofmonetary expansion
22
5ee ,Amsatol B. tiahhaeh, “Ho’v Comstrotlahhe is Money Crowth?”
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Chart 6
Growth of Ml and the Adlusted Monetary Base Li
and contraction. Thums, both reserve availability amid
the amnotmnt of currency inthe hands of the public mtmst
becomitrolled by the monetary authorities ifthey desire
to control money growth.
The miiomietarv base is the stmsn of hank reserves and
cumrrenev in circulation. In the Umted States, it repre-
sents a liability of the Federal Reserve. Even tliotigli
the Federal Reserve does siot possess (liscretiOuarv
cositrol ox-er all ofthe items in its halamice sheet, it does
have sufficient control to determisie the level and
growth of the mosietarv base it desires, even on a
weekly basis.13
~1.l link between the monetary base amid the uionev
supply is the mone- mntmitiplier. Changes in this snulti—
pher reflect changes in the public’s preferesices fUr
various financialassets. Since thesechanges can either
intemisify or mnitigate the itnpact of Federal Reserve




See Bahbacbs, - ‘How Cdsmitrmshlabhe is \h omi cv Growth P’
associated with periods of highly variable mosiev
growth if changes imi the mntsltiplier are highly
unpredictable.24 This, hoxvever. does slot appear to he
the case over periods of one year or snore.
Chart 6 contains four—quarter moving averages ofthe
rates ofgrowth oftile adjs.isted monetaj-v base amid Nil.
ExceptfUr the period in tile mid—1970s, money growth
and base growth have moved together fttirlv closely. 1mi
fact, a 1 percentage—poisit imlerease imi the rate of base
growth heads to appmoximnatcly- a 1 percemitage—point




For a discussion of thus poimit covering the gm-dswthi of money imi
1982. sec R. W’, Hafer amid! Scott E. Iheimi, ‘‘The Wayward Mdsmiey
Supply’: ,k Post—Mortemui of 1982,’ this Rccietc (Mam-ch 1983). phi.
17—25.
INThis can he seemi misare clearly frossi the fohiouving estimated! rela—
tiumiship hetwcems hsasc growth amid MI grd)wthi:
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Model P4o~Mt GNP Raw SlIP N Deflator
St LotI 4SSt 98% 49~
Wharton 462 342 *56
Chase 492 3 38
Further, there appears to be no breakdown in this
relationship since late 1979. Except for the period of
credit controls (II/i980-III/1980) there has been little
difference between the m-ate ofhas gsowth and the rate
of money growth during the post-III/1979 period.26
A CLASH OF COMPETING MODELS~
MOM I &EIS[ ~S \O\-MO\E I 41415 i
VIEWS OF THE ECONOMY
As stated earlier, monetarism canhe rejected only if
there is an alternative explanation of mnaeroeconomnic
behavior that has greater explanatory or predictive
poxs’er. The following experiment was conducted to
ascertain whether the primarily non—monetarist eco-
nomic theories imuherent in two of tile popular large
macroeconomic models could explain economic be-
havior over the past threeyears as well as a moisetarist
model. rrhe St. Louis equatiomu (equation 1) and the
inflation equation cited in footnote 18 were estisnated
over the period from 11/1960to 111/1979. The rates of
growth of nominal CNF (total spendimug). real CNP
(real output) and the GNP price deflator then were
forecast for the next 13 quarters (that is, from IV/1979
to IV/1982). rchese forecasts were compared tothose of
the Wharton and the Chase Econometrics models. The
average absolute forecast errors foreach of these three
models are reported in table 4; the quarterly forecast
errors for each yariable are shown incharts 7, 8 and9.
It should he noted, at the outset, that the empirical
deck was stacked against the inonetarist forecasts; they
~ the stability issue is tested asin footnote 1.5 farthe equation
citedh ism footsuote25. In this case, thecalculated F-statistic is 1.64,
below thecritical value of3,09 atthe 5 percent significance level,
Consequently, the hypothesis that the relationship hetweemi base
growth amid money growth has changed since 111/1979 can he
rejected.
Chart?
Nominal Income Forecast Errors of
Alternative Models
Acluat minus Predicted Values
Chart 8
Real Income Forecast Errors of
Alternative Models
Actual minus Predicted Values
P‘ems mm I
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Cherl 9
Price Forecast Errors of Alternative Models
Actual minus Predicted Values
were obtained using coefficients from empirical rela-
tionships that were estimated through 111/1979 and
never updated. The forecasts from both Chase and
Wharton were one-quarter-ahead forecasts derived
from models that were re-estimated constantly over
the period from IV/1979 to IV/1982Y Despite tisis
estimation bias flivoring tlue non—monetarist models,
there is virtually no difference in the comparative
short-run forecasts for recent years between the pre-
sumably outdated inonetarist model and the updated
non-monetarist ones. For example, while the average
annual absolute forecast errors for nomninah GNP using
the St. Lotus model was 4.95 percent, the Chase result
was virtually identical, and Wiuarton’s was mleariy as
large. From the results in table 4, it is clearthat mleither
of tiuc two alternative models has outperfbrmed this
5T
Tisis estismiatidims bias xs’m’s imitm-dsdhuced to comnpemisate far thefacttbsat
actual values of tbse right—bsamid—sidhe variables wereused to derive
thue St. Luuis forecasts, while Cisase amsd Whuartomu did not kmuow
these values~vbsems tlsey msuade tlseir forecasts. i’his type ofcomsipari’
sdusi obviotssly is isdst the idea! 0mw; it is, ho~s’ever. the best that eass
he accotmsplisisedh without access to thue estimated parammmeters of
the Chsase iti5dl \Vbsam’tomsnsodels. F’or simihisr crsmuiparisomosofthese
ussodehs’ bug-ruts pruperties, see Keith NI. Cam’bsdsms amsd Scott E.
h-hem, “F’our Ecomuomiietrie Morhelsamsdl Masietary Policy: lhd,
Lomsgem’-Rums View,’’ thsis Renew (Jaisuan’ 1983), Pu’ 13—24.
version of a mnonetarist model oyer the past three
years.28
Moreover, the information in charts 7, 8 and 9 re-
veals that the relative performance of tlue St. Louis
forecasts geilerally has res’nained constant throughout
the forecast period, That is, tlue St. Louis forecasts did
not collapse, relative totluoseofChase and Wharton, as
finaiseial innovation continued througluouttile forecast
period. Ifmomietaristn has died, it surely was not killed
off by the superior performnanee of whatever theoreti-
cal relationships underlie these major tuon-monetarist
ecoisomnic models.
SUMMARY ANI) CONCLL~5’ItTh~”~
Mosuetarism can he viewedin two ways. It is a scien-
tific theory that stresses the importance offocusing on
the level or growth of money in order to understand
the behavior of such key macroeconomic variables as
prices, realoutput andspending. As a scientific theory,
it also stresses the importance of focusimug on the he-
lsavior of the monetary authority in order to under-
stand how and why money grows the way it does.
Monetarismn also can be viewed as a diverse collection
ofnormative propositionsabout how fast money should
grow or what the proper monetary policy should he.
While disputesover normative propositions are gener-
ally insolvable, the validity of scientific propositions
can be examined.
This paper has assessed the claim that monetarismn,
in the scientific sense, has Iluiled, by testing four ke
monetarist propositions to see whether they can ex-
plain economic events over the past three years. Cots-
trary to recent rumors of the death of monetarism, we
found that the four propositions tested were as valid
and useful over tile past three years as tluey had beesu
over the prior 20 years. Moreover, when comnpared
with the predictive behavior of two well—known muon—
monetarist econometric models, we found that a sun—
pIe monetarist amlalv’sis worked equally well isu explain—
isug the economic patterns of spending, output and
prices over the past three years. Humors oftile death of
rnonetarism have, indeed, been exaggem-ated.
‘
28
Similar resuhts’,ire ohtaimuecl whuems root muiean sqmsarc errors
(FM SE) are eomn5iaredh fdsr tbie three mrsodehs. This mnethod of
sumnmarizing forecast errdsrs gives msioreweight to large errdsrs thams
dhoes the average (mneams) ahsohute crrdsr,
Modch
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